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I. INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the legality of the United States' role in the Viet-
nam conflict ultimately polarizes into two separate aspects: (1) the
constitutionality of the President's actions with regard to Vietnam,'
and (2) the validity of our intervention in the conflict under inter-
national law.' While these two aspects of the problem are in some
ways interdependent,3 "[t]he international and constitutional conse-
quences of the exercise of the foreign relations power are not identical."4
This difference in consequences is especially significant in view of
the challenges which have been issued against the legality of the "war."
The judiciary has been flooded with cases wherein litigants have
sought to avoid being forced to serve in the armed forces in Vietnam.
These petitioners have typically alleged both that the United States
involvement in -the conflict is unconstitutional and that it is in viola-
* Member, Editorial Board, UNIVERSITY OF MIAmi LAW REVIEW; Student Instructor
for Freshman Research and.Writing I and II.
1. See generally Moore and Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to
the Republic of Vietnam, 112 CONG. REC. 15519 (1966) (constitutional); Note, Congress,
The President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968).
2. See generally Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 Am. J. INT'L L.
750 (1966) ; Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75
YALE L.J. 1122 (1966).
3. See pp. 798-99 infra.
4. Moore, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A Reply, 76
YALE L.J. 1051, 1092 (1967) ; see Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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tion of international law." To date, the courts have uniformly refused
to hear these cases, stating that the petitioners lack proper standing
to raise the issue of the legality of the "war," and further that the
issues involved are inherently non-justiciable.'
Should the courts determine to hear these issues, the petitioner
may find that while a determination that the "war" is unconstitutional
will justify his refusal to serve in the conflict, a showing that the
United States action is violative of international law will not achieve
this result. Ample precedent has been established for the proposition
that the domestic validity of a Presidential or Congressional action
is not affected by the fact that such action is violative of international
law.
The argument has been made that the adoption of the Treaty of
London8 and the Charter of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg,'
making it a crime to participate in an illegal war, should justify a re-
fusal to serve in a war which is violative of international law. This
position has never been seriously considered by any tribunal other than
Nuremberg, and upon close analysis the rationale does not appear
sound. The practical effect of any judicial precedent even impliedly
authorizing the criminal prosecution of every member of the armed
forces of a nation guilty of violating international law would be tre-
mendous. Certainly no domestic court would accept this rationale and
then proceed to declare the "war" illegal-thereby "branding" every
member of its armed forces an international criminal subject to prose-
cution.
While the international status of our involvement in Vietnam does
not affect the domestic rights of our citizens, it is very important in
terms of the position occupied by the United States in the world com-
munity of nations. A complete analysis of our role in Vietnam must,
therefore, treat both the constitutional and the international aspects
of the situation.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT-WHAT IS A WAR?
The challenges against the constitutionality of the United States'
role in Vietnam are all based upon the assumption that the conflict is
a "war" within the meaning of Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution. 0
5. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 945 (1967); United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 972 (1967).
6. Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Mora v. McNamara,
389 U.S. 934, 937 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to Mora v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
7. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888).
8. 59 Stat. 1546 (1945).
9. 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
10. See cases cited note 5 supra, alleging that the President is conducting a "war" with-
out a declaration of war from Congress.
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If our activities in Vietnam do not constitute engaging in a "war,"
there can be no doubt the the Executive's actions are constitutional.
It thus becomes important to determine the meaning of a "war" in the
constitutional sense.
Courts have tended to attach a broad meaning to the term "war."
In the Prize Cases," for example, the Supreme Court held that a state
of war exists whenever a nation prosecutes its rights by force. It is un-
likely, however, that the Court would adopt so broad a definition if it
were squarely faced with the issue of whether the Vietnam conflict is
a war.
Military tribunals have adopted a far more restricted definition
of the existence of war in cases arising under the Military Code of
Justice." Here the emphasis is placed upon the number of troops in-
volved, the financial expenditures required, and other similar factors.
When these criteria are applied to Vietnam, it is clear that the
conflict qualifies as a war. At present, approximately 600,000 combat
troops and more than 50% of the nation's entire airpower is committed
to military activities in Vietnam.' 3 In addition, over 25,000 Americans
have been killed and more than 100,000 wounded, and more bomb
tonnage has been dropped than was dropped on America's European
enemies in World War II. 1" These facts have led one military tribunal
to conclude that the Vietnam conflict is in fact a "war." 5
It would also appear that the United States government has cat-
egorized Vietnam as a war zone. The Republic of Vietnam Campaign
Medal, which is awarded to members of the armed forces of the Re-
public of Vietnam only in war time, has recently been authorized to be
awarded to American servicemen in Vietnam.' 6
The fact that a formal declaration of war has never been issued
will not affect the legal status of the conflict. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that if all other factors of a war exist,.the fact that
no formal declaration of war has been issued is irrelevant."
It therefore appears obvious that the Vietnam conflict is in fact
a "war,, within the meaning of Article 1 Section 8. The following anal-
ysis of the constitutional and international status of our involvement
in the conflict proceeds upon this premise.
11. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
12. See United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3,5, 11 C.M.R. 3,5 (1953):
We believe a finding that this is a time of war ... is compelled by the very nature
of the conflict; the manner in which it is carried on; the movement to, and the
presence of large numbers of American men and women on, the battlefields . . . ;
the casualties involved; the sacrifices required; the drafting of recruits to maintain
the large number of persons in the military service . . . ; and the tremendous sums
being expended ....
13. 114 CONG. REC. 6490 (1968) (remarks of Senator Young).
14. Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally
Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REv. 449, 452, 454 (1968).
15. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
16. 32 C.F.R. § 47.1-5 (1968).
17. E.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36, 39-40 (1800) ; The Protector, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 700, 702 (1871); Mastersen v. Howard, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 99, 105 (1873).
COMMENTS
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR OUR INVOLVEMENT
A. Unilateral Presidential Action
1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS-ARTICLE 1 SECTION 8
VERSUS ARTICLE 2 SECTION 2
The interpretation of constitutional provisions requires an analy-
sis of their origin as well as the "line of their growth."" When viewed
in terms of their origin, the meaning of both Article 1 Section 8 and
Article 2 Section 2 is clear.
The Constitution was written with the desire to avoid many of the
evils of the monarchies of Europe. The framers considered the tendency
of monarchs to unilaterally involve their people in wars which were not
really in the best interest of the people to be "the most oppressive of
all Kingly oppressions."'" To eliminate this evil, the drafters specifi-
cally vested the power to declare war in the body most representative
of the people-Congress.
20
Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the "Presi-
dent shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. . . ." When
viewed in the context of the environment in which is was framed, it
would be unreasonable to interpret this clause as granting to the Exec-
utive uncontrolled power to deploy the armed forces of the United
States.
21
Evidence exists that the states in ratifying the Constitution un-
derstood that the provisions of Article 2 Section 2 did not grant the
President the power to initiate war.22 Ratification of the Constitution
was conditioned on the belief that under the provisions of the docu-
ment, the President would not be vested with massive war-powers
which could be used arbitrarily and without check. 3
The "check" upon the Executive war power is embodied in Article
1 Section 8, which gives Congress the power "to declare war.' 24 The
records of the Constitutional Convention indicate that the original draft
of the Constitution gave Congress the power to "make" war.25 Several
delegates expressed the fear that this terminology might lend itself to
an interpretation that the President could initiate a war. To avoid any
possibility of such an interpretation the word "declare" was substituted
18. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.); accord, Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
19. 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
20. J. MADISON, DEBATES ON THE: FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 439 (J. Elliot ed. 1845).
21. Id. (remarks of Mr. Sherman).
22. See Wilson, State House Speech, in A. MASON, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING
265 (3d ed. 1965); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
89-90 (2d ed. 1851).
23. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 180 (4th ed. 1964); 1 M. FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Or 1787, at 316 (1911).
24. 7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 746 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851); 15 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON 397
(Boyd ed. 1955); THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton).
25. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 313 (rev.
ed. 1937).
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for "make."26 "In other words," stated Alexander Hamilton, "it be-
longs to Congress only to go to war."27 This position gains further
support from the Federalist Papers,28 which are normally given great
weight in determining the true purpose of Constitutional provisions. 9
The effect of giving the war-declaring power to Congress is to
deny the exercise of this power by any other branch of the govern-
ment . 0 Thus, under the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the
President may not initiate a war.s1
2. EFFECT OF HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,82 "It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and
to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them." Arguments
have been advanced that Presidential action or inaction which would
normally be unconstitutional may be justified by showing a consistent
pattern of similar unchallenged behavior by previous presidents.88 Pro-
ponents of this position suggest the "the precedents by which execu-
tive action is to be judged are chiefly historical or political, not judi-
cial, precedents.""4
If this rationale is correct, it would probably justify the Presi-
dent's action in Vietnam even if it is determined that he initiated a
war without prior Congressional approval. A Senate document reports
that since 1789 there have been at least 125 incidents in which our
armed forces have been ordered to take action abroad without a
declaration of war. 5 And, more significantly, "four of our nine serious
extended engagements with force against another nation were con-
ducted without Congress 'declaring war' at all."86
The Korean conflict is the most recent example of a massive em-
26. Id. at 318-19.
27. A. HAMILTON, No. I of "Lucius Crassus" in ALEXANEER HAMILTON AND THE FOUND-
ING OF THE NATION 526 (R. Morris ed. 1957).
28. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 41, at 256 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
29. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 280 (1878).
30. Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 674-75 (1873).
31. The framers did recognize an exception to this principle:
But when a foreign nation declares or openly makes war upon the United States,
they are then by the very fact already at war, and any declaration on the part of
Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary.
7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 746 (J. HAMILTON ed. 1851). No open or declared war exists, how-
ever, between the United States and North Vietnam or the Viet Cong.
32. 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952).
33. Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution, in 11 AMERICA LOOKS AHEAD 78-79
(1945).
34. Jones, The President, Congress and Foreign Relations, 29 CALI'. L. REv. 565, 577
(1941).
35. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND COMM. ON A MED SERVICES
OF THE SENATE, 82D CONG., 1ST SESS., POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND THE ARM-ED FORCES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 2 (Comm. Print 1951).
36. Rogers, supra note 33, at 45.
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ployment of troops over an extended period of time without a con-
gressional declaration of war. It has been maintained that Korea is
a unique situation because the action was taken pursuant to a United
Nations recommendation. 7 However, this distinction should not be suf-
ficient to destroy the value of Korea as valid precedent. In a constitu-
tional sense, the United Nations Charter is a part of the "supreme
law of the land,"88 but it is afforded no greater significance than any
other treaty to which the United States is a party. Further, under the
applicable articles of the Charter,8 9 no firm obligation was placed upon
the United States to engage in the hostilities in Korea,4° and no other
treaty commitments at that time obligated us to join in the defense of
South Korea.4' In addition, as a practical matter, the decision to go to
the aid of South Korea was made in Washington by the President be-
fore the Security Council issued its recommendation.42
With regard to Vietnam itself, beginning in 1954 some precedent
has been established by the fact that four Presidents have prescribed
military assistance to South Vietnam for the past fifteen years. 48 Thus,
it appears that if the Constitution can be interpreted by practice, the
President's actions with regard to Vietnam would be justified.
In 1915, the Supreme Court recognized "a wise and quieting rule
that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a
power, great weight should be given to the usage itself even when the
validity of the practice is the subject of investigation."44 This appears
to be a valid and necessary rule if any degree of stability is to be main-
tained in governmental functions. The Court retreated from this posi-
tion in Youngstown Skeet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,45 however, when it
held that President Truman's seizure of a private enterprise in order
to settle a labor dispute could not be justified by the fact that prior
37. Hoyt, The United States Reaction to the Korean Attack: A Study of the Principles
of the United Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy Making, 55 Am. J. INT'L L.
45 (1961).
38. U. S. CONST. art. IV.
39. U. N. CHARTER arts. 45, 48.
40. See G. CLARK and L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (1958), for a
discussion of the non-binding effect of Security Council recommendations.
41. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DEP'T OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM, 112 CONG. REc. 5504, 5509 (1966).
42. Hoyt, supra note 37.
43. See generally STAFF OF SENATE COiM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BACKGROUND IN
FORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (4th rev. ed.
Comm. Print 1968); Address by President Johnson on America's Efforts Toward World
Order, A.B.A., Aug. 12, 1964, in 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 298, 299 (1964). However, much of
the assistance during the first ten years of this period was of a very limited nature.
44. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). The Court based its opinion
on the premise that:
citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive
Department-on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been
allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. Id. at 472-73.
45. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Presidents had acted in a similar manner without Congressional au-
thority.
46
While the rationale of the prior decision seems more logical and
practical, it is doubtful the Supreme Court would reverse the position
it took in Youngstown if it were faced with the contention that the
President's actions in Vietnam are justified by historical precedent. At
best, it can be surmised that the Court would be strongly influenced
by the fact that similar practices have been acquiesced in by Congress
on a number of prior occasions.
3. VIOLATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Article IV of the Constitution gives treaties the status of "supreme
law of the land."4 It should follow, a fortiori, that the Executive may
not constitutionally violate any treaty provisions. The pragmatic value
of this limitation, however, is doubtful.
The President's broad, plenary power to determine the foreign
policy of this country has long been recognized. 8 When the President
acts in the foreign relations field, courts have consistently refused to
review his actions. 9 Thus, since the case of Ware v. Hylon,50 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1796, the courts of this country have uni-
formly held that it is not for the judiciary to determine whether the
President has broken a treaty,5' or even whether a treaty has been
terminated or is still in existence.52 Since no court will even rule on the
possibility of a treaty violation, it would be virtually impossible for a
judicial tribunal to find a Presidential act unconstitutional because it
violated a treaty obligation.
Even if a court did address itself to the question of whether a
Presidential action violated a treaty, the court would be bound by all
Executive determinations of fact with regard to our foreign policy.5"
Since the President has determined that an actual "armed attack" has
46. Id. at 588-89, where the court says:
Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution ....
47. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
48. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
49. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
50. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 158 (1796).
51. Quoting from George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 94 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 572 (1938), the rationale for this position was stated in Z & F
Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 470
(1941):
Obviously, it would not do for the courts to declare that an act is a breach of a
treaty and results in this or that remedy. The remedy accorded might not content
the foreign power or might bring about a conflict between the executive and judicial
branches of our own government.
52. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285 (1902).
53. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 414, 420 (1839); Latvian State
Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 816 (1951).
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occurred in Vietnam,54 all subsequent actions could be justified under
the doctrine of self-defense.5 5 This conclusion demonstrates the futility
of alleging a violation of a treaty obligation before a tribunal which is
bound to accept without question every finding of fact by the Presi-
dent, as in every case the Executive needs only to make those factual
determinations which will justify his action.
It should be noted that the domestic and international conse-
quences of a treaty violation are not synonymous. The judicial reluc-
tance to consider possible treaty violations may be conclusive in a
constitutional sense, but it is irrelevant with regard to a possible vio-
lation of international law.56 The President may not defend his actions
before an international tribunal by. asserting that our domestic courts
refuse to recognize any violations of our treaty obligations.5 '
B. Joint Congressional-Executive Action
1. FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR
It is a settled rule of constitutional litigation that where the sole
responsibility for decision-making is granted to one branch of the gov-
ernment, it may not surrender that responsibility to a co-ordinate
branch.5 8 Thus, whatever authority Congress may seek to delegate to
the President, it cannot delegate the power to declare war, since under
Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution that power is reserved exclu-
sively to Congress. Were it not for this rule, Congress could, by simple
resolution, disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
give the President the power to initiate war.59 Such a significant change
in the effect of the Constitution should be made only by Constitutional
amendment.
Congress may, however, validly authorize hostilities without a
declaration of war.60 In fact, the use of a formal declaration of war is
now the exception rather than the rule.6 '
Since no formal declaration of war has been issued with regard
to Vietnam, it must be determined whether Congress has authorized
54. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam,
54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474 (1966).
55. Every applicable treaty to which the United States is a party recognizes the in-
herent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack. This point is discussed more
completely at pp. 811-13 infra.
56. Dickenson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 451, 488 (1956).
57. The international status of our role in Vietnam is discussed at pp. 000 to 000 infra.
58. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
59. See text accompanying notes 19-31 supra.
60. SENATE COmm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL COMI1TMENTS, S. REP. No. 797,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1967) ; Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 36 (1800).
61. Rogers, supra note 33, at 41; F. MAURICE, HoSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF
WAR 4 (1883).
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any military activities in Southeast Asia and, if so, whether the Presi-
dent's action in Vietnam complies with this authorization.
2. DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Under the Constitution, the entire sovereign power of the United
States to conduct military and diplomatic relations with foreign nations
is delegated to the President and to Congress.6" Since the sole authority
in this area rests in these two branches of the government, many
writers have concluded that when the President and Congress act con-
currently in a foreign relations area their actions can never be uncon-
stitutional.6" Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, concluded that if the President acts pur-
suant to Congressional authorization his act can be found unconstitu-
tional only if "the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power.7
6 4
Absent a formal declaration of war, the use of a "special resolu-
tion of Congress seems proper and has been the usual practice"65 in
congressional authorizations of the use of armed forces in a foreign
nation.66 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,67 the Su-
preme Court stated that Congress may, by resolution, grant the Presi-
dent the authority to exercise congressional powers based on his un-
restricted judgment. 8 The effect of this opinion "would seem in effect
to withdraw virtually all constitutional limitations upon the scope of
congressional delegation of power to the President to act in the area of
international relations."6
It is not safe to conclude, however, that the Supreme Court would
uphold a congressional resolution giving the President unrestricted
control of the military situation in Vietnam.7° In the recent decision
of Zemel v. Rusk,71 the Court stated that "this does not mean that
62. U. S. CONST. arts. I, II.
63. See Moore, International Law and the United States Role in Vietnam: A Reply,
76 YALE L.J. 1051, 1092 (1967).
64. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952):
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate.
65. Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 309-10 (1922).
66. CI. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1870): "Upon the
exercise of these [congressional war] powers no restrictions are imposed."
67. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
68. Id. at 324:
Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more acts
or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of
subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to
his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which
has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.
69. Jones, supra note 34, at 575; accord, C. CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND
POWERS 1787-1957, at 239 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
70. Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
71. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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simply because a statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the
Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice." 2 In addition, an un-
restricted delegation of power could be construed as a grant of war-
initiating authority, and thus invalid."r
3. THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
Proponents of the constitutionality of the war often cite the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution 74 as a congressional authorization for the Presi-
dent's action in Vietnam. The Resolution will not validly support such
action, however, unless it has sufficient guidelines for presidential ac-
tion and was intended to authorize the type of action now being under-
taken by the President.
Section two of the Tonkin Resolution purports to grant the Presi-
dent the power to use armed force to protect any member or protocol
state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.75 Vietnam is,
of course, one of these protocol states. This broad wording, coupled
with the acquiescence of Congress since the adoption of the "resolu-
tion, 6 seems to indicate that Congress intended to authorize the present
presidential activities when it passed the Resolution.
When the Resolution is interpreted in the context of the events
which led to its introduction, however, its true meaning is not clear.
The Resolution was considered five days after an allegedly unprovoked
attack upon two American destroyers,77 and most of the debates cen-
tered upon this issue.78 There is, in fact, considerable doubt that the
majority of Congress intended to do anything more than express unity
and support for the President in a moment of national crisis.7 9 Further,
Congressional acceptance of the Resolution was undoubtedly influenced
72. Id. at 17.
73. See pp. 795-96 supra.
74. 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
75. Id. § 2:
The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and
in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to
take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.
76. Congress could have repealed the Resolution if at any time it were opposed to
the use of the document to justify Presidential action in Vietnam. See 110 CONG. REc.
18409 (1964) (remarks of Senator Fulbright) ; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 481 (1915):
Its acquiescence was [is] equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the
power was [is] revoked by some subsequent action by Congress.
77. R. HULL and J. NOVCOROD, LAW AND VIETNAM 176 (1968).
78. See 110 CONG. REC. 18,409-60 (Aug. 6-7, 1964).
79. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 60, at 20:
The prevailing attitude was not so much that Congress was granting or acknowl-
edging the executive's authority to take certain actions but that it was expressing
unity and support for the President in a moment of national crisis. ...
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by the President's message in support, in which he emphasized that
"[a]s I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rash-
ness and seeks no wider war." 0
The Congressional debates prior to the adoption of the Resolution
are at best inconclusive. The debates on the Resolution lasted two days
(August 6 and 7, 1964). Strangely, the opinions of the Congressmen
as to the scope of the Resolution changed abruptly sometime during
the night of August 6, with the result that the conclusions to be drawn
from the debates on the two separate days are diametrically opposed
to one another. During the debates held on August 6, two senators
termed the Resolution a "pre-dated declaration of war."'" Senator
Fulbright's remarks clearly indicated that the Resolution gave the
President the power to use whatever force was necessary, even to the
extent of leading us into war.82
On the next day, however, Senator Nelson introduced an amend-
ment to the Resolution which would have limited our participation to
"the provision of aid, training assistance and military advice."88 In the
discussion on this amendment Senator Fulbright stated that "it states
fairly accurately what the President has said our policy would be . . .
I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution (Tonkin), but it
is an enlargement."84
It appears, therefore, that few if any definite conclusions as to the
scope of the Resolution can be drawn from the congressional debates
surrounding its adoption. In view of this inconclusive legislative his-
tory, the Resolution will probably be interpreted on the basis of the
apparent meaning on its face.85
A meaningful interpretation of the wording of the Resolution may
be gained by comparing it with the wording of prior congressional
resolutions, some of which were intended to delegate the authority to
use force and others which were not so intended. In this regard, the
joint resolutions on the Middle East,86 Formosa,8 7 and Cuba88 are typ-
ical and illustrative of general congressional practice.
80. 112 CONG. REC. 18,132 (1964).
81. 110 CONG. REC. 18,430 (Aug. 6, 1964) (remarks of Senator Morse); 110 CoNG. REC.
18,469 (Aug. 6, 1964) (remarks of Senator Gruening).
82. The following discourse during the debates is illustrative of the point:
Mr. Cooper: Are we now giving the President advance authority to take whatever
action he may deem necessary respecting South Vietnam and its defense or with
respect to the defense of any other country included in the [S.E.A.T.O.] treaty.
Mr. FuIbright (in response): I think that is correct.
Mr. Cooper: Then looking ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to
use such force as could lead us into war, we could give that authority by this
resolution.
Mr. Fulbright: That is the way I would interpret it.
110 CoNG. REc. 18,409 (Aug. 6, 1964).
83. 110 CoNo. REc. 18,459 (Aug. 7, 1964).
84. Id.
85. CI. South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. & Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622
(Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1964).
86. 71 Stat. 5 (1957).
87. 69 Stat. 7 (1955).
88. 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
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The resolutions dealing with the Middle East and Formosa were
intended to delegate the power to take military action, while the Cuban
resolution was intended solely as a statement of policy.89 The wording
in each of the former two resolutions is similar to that employed in
the Tonkin Resolution, while the resolution on Cuba lacks the termi-
nology that the "President shall take whatever steps he deems neces-
sary."9 In addition, the resolutions dealing with the Middle East,
Formosa and Tonkin all contain termination clauses."' Because there
is no delegation of power in the Cuban resolution, it does not contain
a termination clause.92
It is reasonable to assume, then, that in adopting the Tonkin
Resolution Congress did intend to grant the President the power to
employ military force as he "deems necessary." To be a valid delega-
tion of Congressional power, a resolution should contain some guide-
lines for the exercise of the power.93 These guidelines need not, how-
ever, be "narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be
governed.
'9 4
It is not certain that the Tonkin Resolution lays down even gen-
eral guidelines for presidential action. Section two states that any ac-
tion taken under it must be "[c]onsonant with the Constitution of the
United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance
with [the] obligations [of] the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty. . . ." but these limitations are probably mere reiterations of
responsibilities that would be owed even if they were never mentioned,
rather than definite restrictions on the exercise of presidential power.
No judicial precedent has been established by which such sweep-
ing delegations of military power can be judged. It is clear only that the
court will weigh the practical necessity of wide discretion being granted
in an area such as this95 against the inherent purpose of the applicable
89. See 110 CONG. REC. 18,429 (Aug. 6, 1964) (remarks of Senator Morse).
90. The wording in the Formosa, Middle East and Tonkin Resolutions is very similar:
Formosa-"the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized
to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems nec-
essary ..
69 Stat. 7 (1955).
Middle East--"if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States
is prepared to use armed forces .
71 Stat. 5 (1957).
Tonkin---"the United States is, therefore, prepared as the President determines,
to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force ....
78 Stat. 384 (1964).
The Cuban resolution, on the other hand, never mentions the President and provides only
"That the United States is determined . . . ." 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
91. All three resolutions contain the almost identical phrase that "This [joint] resolu-
tion shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area
[is assured] . .. .
92. 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
93. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra; see also E. CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT'S
CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 149-50 (1917).
94. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936).
95. See text accompanying notes 105-112 supra.
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sections of the Constitution to prevent the President from obtaining
complete control of the nation's war power.9 6 .
4. THE SEATO TREATY
It has been argued that the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty,9 7 to which the United States is a signatory98 and South Vietnam
is a protocol state,99 also provides a constitutional justification for the
actions taken by the President in South Vietnam.'0 0 Essentially, the
Treaty provides that in the event of an actual "armed attack" against
a member or protocol state, all signatories of the Treaty will "act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional pro-
cess."'' The Treaty further provides that if a
territory . .. is threatened in any way other than by armed
attack ... the [SEATO] parties shall consult immediately in
order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the
common defense.'2
Advocates of the government position argue that the Treaty, having
been ratified by Congress, provides a congressional authorization of
presidential action in response to an attack against South Vietnam.
The Senate debates pursuant to the adoption of the treaty indicate
that most senators did not consider the SEATO Treaty as binding the
United States to any duty to unilaterally intervene in the defense of
South Vietnam,' and these debates are highly persuasive in determin-
ing the congressional intent in adopting the treaty. 0 4 However, the
wording of Article 2 clearly indicates that in the event of an "armed
attack," as contrasted to the threat of attack, unilateral action by all
parties to the treaty was called for.' Thus, if an actual armed attack
occurred, the United States' action was probably consonant with the
provisions of the Treaty.
If the attack on South Vietnam was by some means other than an
"armed attack" the United States had a duty to consult with the other
96. See text accompanying notes 19-31 supra.
97. [1955] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 41.
101. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, art. IV, para. 1, [1955]
6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170 (effective Feb. 19, 1955).
102. Id. at art. IV, para. 2.
103. The remarks of Senator George, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, are typical:
The treaty does not call for automatic action; it calls for consolidation with other
signatories .. .I cannot emphasize too strongly that we have no obligation .. .to
take positive measures of any kind. All we are obligated to do is consult together
about it.
101 CONG. REC. 1051-52 (1955).
104. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
105. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, art. IV, para. 1, [19551
6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170 (effective Feb. 19, 1955).
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SEATO members before taking any action.'0 6 Consultations were con-
ducted and express approval of the United States position was given
by the SEATO Council at its meeting in Canberra, Australia, on June
29, 1966, with the French representatives abstaining and the Pakistani
representative reserving.0 7 This consultation was not held, however, until
after the United States had begun bombing the North, in February,
1965.108 Thus, the United States breached its duty of prior consultation
if our action was taken pursuant to Article 4(2) (threat of attack).
For purposes of testing the constitutionality of the President's
action, the fact that an "armed attack" occurred must be accepted as
true;'0 9 therefore, the United States could constitutionally respond to
the "attack" without consulting the other SEATO members. Since the
President complied with the requirements of the treaty, he was at least
impliedly acting pursuant to a congressional mandate (in the form of
a treaty).
5. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS-IMPLIED CONSENT
Advocates of the constitutionality of the war point to the many
congressional military appropriation bills as at least implying authoriza-
tion for the President's actions in Vietnam."0 To be sure, the passage
of each bill contains affirmations of congressional support for our Viet-
nam effort."' In sending the 1965 bill to Congress, President Johnson
stated:
This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Con-
gress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our
effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam.'
The Supreme Court recognized this means of congressional autho-
rization in the Prize Casesn" when Justice Grier found a congressional
sanction of President Lincoln's actions "in almost every act passed at
the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1861 . ... ,, In addi-
tion, Congress has frequently sought to affirm the President's employ-
ment of military force by approving appropriation bills to finance the
cost of the operation and stating, at the time of passage, that the bill is
a reaffirmation of the President's action."'
106. D. & A. LARSON, VIETNAM AND BEYOND 17 (1965).
107. Wright, supra note 2, at 751.
108. Id. at 769.
109. Cf. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
110. See 114 CONG. REC. S 11,979 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1968); Military Appropriation
Bill, 81 Stat. 5 (1967) ; N.Y. Times, March 23, 1966, at 13, col. 1 (city ed.).
111. Remarks of Congressman Ford during the debates on the 1966 appropriation bill:
Anyone who votes for this legislation is endorsing the policy currently being exe-
cuted by the Commander in Chief."
112 CONG. REc. 5818 (1966).
112. 112 CoNG. REC. 9,729 (1965).
113. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
114. Id. at 669.
115. E. CORWIN, supra note 23, at 223-24.
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More recently, however, the Supreme Court has held that where
the constitutionality of an executive program is in question, the Court
will not infer congressional authorization from funding of the program
or failure to specifically repeal it."' This appears to be the better rule
with regard to Vietnam. At the time the appropriation bills were be-
fore Congress, massive numbers of our troops were already engaged in
fighting in Vietnam. The practical effect of a failure to enact the ap-
propriation bills, then, would be to cut off the supply of food and am-
munition from our men at the front. Such a vote would be political
suicide for a Congressman. It is doubtful, therefore, that these appro-
priation bills should be considered anything more than an opportunity
for proponents of the administration's policy to proclaim the united
support of the Congress for the President and to tack these proclama-
tions onto legislation which, as a practical matter, could not fail to be
passed."I7
C. A Pragmatic Approach
Alexander Hamilton once wrote that "no constitutional shackles
can be wisely imposed upon the so-called war powers.""' The unique
nature of foreign relations demands that our foreign relations "machin-
ery" be kept as flexible as possible."'
Any attempt to enforce rigid constitutional standards on the Presi-
dent's use of the military could greatly weaken our military position in
Southeast Asia and pose an even more serious threat to the security of
our troops in Vietnam than already exists. The President, who is "im-
mediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to,
evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature,"' 2 must therefore
be given the authority to employ force as he "deems necessary." And
yet, unrestricted Presidential control of the military would render Arti-
cle 1 Section 8 of the Constitution nugatory and, in effect, create the
very type of situation the framers of the Constitution feared the most
and strove so deliberately to prevent.
The answer cannot lie in a requirement that war be formally de-
clared prior to any large scale employment of troops. The juridical
consequences of such a formal declaration are such that today war is
hardly, if ever, formally declared. 121 In fact, there has been no formal
declaration of war issued since the inception of the United Nations in
1947.
116. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-07 (1959).
117. But see Moore and Underwood, supra note 1.
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 119-20 (G. Smith ed., 1901) (A. Hamilton).
119. See C. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1921).
120. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
121. Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, supra
note 1, at 1772-73:
the formal declaration of war in the modern context is often deliberately avoided
precisely because of the apparent commitment to total victory and the general
hardening of attitudes likely to result.
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In the Vietnam situation, the issuance of a formal declaration of
war by the United States would make the informal and delicate Paris
negotiations more difficult. It would necessitate a formal peace treaty
and would substantially restrict the flexibility of all parties seeking to
resolve the conflict. And finally, a formal declaration of war could di-
rectly involve China and Russia-major Communist allies bound to
North Vietnam by mutual defense treaties.'22
The only practical solution to the problem probably lies in the
power of Congress to express its position in joint resolutions. The Presi-
dent must be given the power to use force where he deems it to be
necessary, subject to the right of Congress to adopt a policy resolution
opposing the President's action. In a situation such as Vietnam, where
Congress has failed to adopt such a resolution or even to repeal the
Tonkin Resolution,12 the President's action should be deemed consti-
tutional.
This procedure would establish a flexible, workable war-making
"machinery" whereby the President would maintain the power to op-
erate effectively as the functional head of the armed forces, and the
will of the people could be expressed through the body most representa-
tive of the people-Congress. 124 Congress has frequently used a joint
resolution to affirm the President's position. The time has come to use
this same tool to dissent from his position.125
IV. THE LEGALITY OF OUR INVOLVEMENT UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW
A. The Geneva Accords of 1954
Active American participation in the Vietnam conflict began in
1954, after the cessation of hostilities pursuant to the Geneva Ac-
cords.'26 The Accords placed certain restrictions on the scope of activ-
ities which could be carried on in the North and South zones and further
limited the activities of the so-called government of each sector.
While the United States was not a party to this document, her
122. DEP'T OF STATE, THE QUESTION OF A FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM
(1965), cited in STAFF OF SENATE COm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 168 (4th rev. ed.
Comm. Print 1968) ; see also Falk, supra note 2, at 1154.
123. On March 1, 1966, Senator Morse introduced an amendment to an appropriations
bill which sought to repeal the Tonkin Resolution. The amendment was defeated by a vote
of 92 to 5. 112 CONG. REc. 15,558 (1966).
124. Use of a joint resolution dissenting from the President's position should not be
confused with a refusal of appropriation bills. As discussed previously, practical consider-
ations would normally require approval of such measures regardless of congressional opin-
ion of the President's action.
125. Under no circumstances, however, should Congress delegate the power to formally
declare war to the President.
126. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, July 20, 1954, in U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 6446, 1 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1950-1955, BASIC DOCUMENTS
750 (1957).
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subsequent involvement in the affairs of Vietnam obligated her to abide
by the provisions of the agreement." 7 Thus, the legality of our position
in the conflict depends to some extent upon how well we have complied
with these provisions.
While factual determinations with regard to Vietnam are often
difficult to verify, it is clear that by 1965, if not before, both the
United States and North Vietnam had violated numerous provisions of
the Accords.' Legal responsibility, therefore, must rest upon the coun-
try that first violated the agreement.
29
Initial allegations of a breach of the agreement center around
Article 7 of the Final Declaration, which provides that "general elec-
tions shall be held in July, 1956,"'' 0 pursuant to a reunification of the
North and South zones under one government. On July 16, 1955, the
Diem regime (then ruling South Vietnam), with American backing,
announced that it would not participate in the prescribed nation-wide
elections and would not negotiate with Hanoi about their modalities.'
Critics of United States' participation in the war claim that this refusal
to hold general elections was the initial breach of the Accords and
justified any subsequent breaches by North Vietnam. 32
It has been contended that when the cease-fire agreement was
signed, "there seem to have been only minimal shared expectations on
the political settlement;" ' 3 therefore, the failure of South Vietnam to
hold elections would not justify retaliatory military action by the
North. It is more likely, however, that the decision not to hold elec-
tions was based on political expediency,' and was made in spite of
the fact that it violated the Accords. 5
While the refusal to hold elections probably was a breach of the
Accords, it does not necessarily follow that this breach justifies all sub-
127. LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1967).
128. As of this date, infiltration from the North was firmly established and the United
States had begun bombing the North. Both of these actions were contrary to the Geneva
Accords. See Wright, supra note 2, at 755.
129. Unless the other party reacted in a disproportionate manner, as may well have
been the case.
130. Supra note 126, at art. 7.
131. Standard, United States Intervention in Vietnam is Not Legal, 52 A.B.A.J. 627,
631 (1966); VIETNAM: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND OPINION ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS
160-74 (H. Gettleman ed. 1965).
132. The United States has accepted the proposition that a material breach by one
party to an agreement entitles the other party to withhold its compliance with the agree-
ment "until the defaulting party is prepared to honor its obligations." OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISOR, supra note 41, at 4434. Of course, the United States claims that North Vietnam
first violated the Accords. Id.
133. Moore, supra note 4, at 1064.
134. President Eisenhower has given the reason for the failure of the United States to
allow a general election in 1956:
persons knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs (believed that) possibly 80 per cent
of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh.
D. EISENHOWER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956 372 (1963).
135. Wright, supra note 2, at 761.
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sequent military action by North Vietnam. Under international law, a
breach of an agreement entitles the aggrieved party to respond only in
a manner proportionate to the scope and severity of the infraction by
the breaching party."' North Vietnam responded to the South's refusal
to conduct general elections by renewing active hostilities.11 7 It is un-
likely that this response could be held proportionate to the initial
breach of the cease-fire agreement.
With the renewal of hostilities, it became apparent that neither
side considered itself bound by the Accords or even attempted to abide
by them. Massive troop and armament infiltration from the North was
countered by a buildup of American troops and armaments in the
South, and finally with the actual bombing by American aircraft of
military targets in North Vietnam.'
It is nearly impossible to make a valid factual determination as
to the extent or chronological order of violations of the Accords by
both sides following the failure to have nation-wide elections in 1956.
Even if such determinations could be made, it is not likely that an
international tribunal would give effect to the Accords, in view of the
fact that both sides acted as if they did not exist. It appears, there-
fore, that if the United States is violating international law by its par-
ticipation in Vietnam, this violation must be based on some document
or legal principle other than the Geneva Accords.
B. The United Nations Charter
1. "CIVIL STRIFE" OR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the principle of
"self-determination of peoples."' 3 9 Included in the right of self-deter-
mination is the right to conduct a rebellion in order to oust an unpopu-
lar government. 4 ° It follows, a fortiori, that when a government is in
danger of being toppled by insurgents, neither party is competent to
request foreign intervention. 4' Thus, if the Vietnam conflict is a civil
strife, indigenous to that country alone, the United States cannot legally
participate in the conflict.
It is not clear that the insurrection led by Ho Chi Minh against
the French was ever a civil strife. 42 However, even if it was, with the
with the adoption of the Geneva Accords and the partition of the coun-
136. I. DETTER, TREATIES 91 (1967).
137. Wright, supra note 2, at 761.
138. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 41.
139. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
140. Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 112, 121
(1959).
141. W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (8th ed. 1924).
142. Compare Wright, supra note 2, at 756-58, with Address by W. Sebold, Collective
Security on the Search for Peace, Univ. of Wyo. Feb. 12, 1955, in 32 DEP'T. STATE BULL.
375, 378 (1955).
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try into two zones the conflict took on a new dimension and became,
in effect, an international war. Sir H. Lauterpacht points out that a
conflict which was at its inception a civil strife "may become war
through the recognition of the contending parties, or of the insurgents
as a belligerent power. Through such recognition, a body of individuals
receives an international position. . . .
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that since 1954
both North and South Vietnam have achieved at least de facto status
as independent states."' Since that time South Vietnam has been rec-
ognized as a sovereign nation by about sixty nations and has de jure
diplomatic relations with about fifty-two of them.'45 Further, North
Vietnam is similarly recognized by about twenty-four nations.146
The de jure status of South Vietnam has been noted by the United
Nations General Assembly, which has expressed the opinion that the
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) is fully qualified for United Na-
tions membership. 147 Membership has not been granted only because
each time South Vietnam has sought to become a member, the Soviet
Union has vetoed the resolution in the Security Council. 48
Dissenters from the government position point out that when the
sharp increase in the American military effort began in early 1965, it
was estimated that only 400 North Vietnamese soldiers were among
the enemy forces in the South, which totalled 140,000 at that time. 149
This fact, they claim, substantiates the position that until the United
States escalated the war, the conflict involved only the government of
South Vietnam and an indigenous guerilla movement-the Vietcong. If
this were true, the conflict would have been a civil strife in spite of
the fact that North and South Vietnam were separate political entities.
However, in 1962, the International Control Commission,'" cre-
ated to police the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam,
reported that men and munitions were being infiltrated from North
143. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948).
144. Freidmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 Am. J.
INT'L L. 857, 866 (1965); But see statement of Secretary of State Rusk that the war is
an "effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the
people of the other half . . . . Testimony by Sec. D. Rusk and Gen. M. Taylor on The
U.S. Commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental Issues, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
Feb. 18, 1966, in 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 346, 352 (1966).
145. OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 41, at 5521.
146. Moore, supra note 4, at 1056.
147. 12 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/3712
(1957); 11 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res. 523
(1957).
148. 13 U.N. SCOR 843d meeting 8-10, (1958); 12 U.N. SCOR, 790th meeting 5,
(1957).
149. Report of Senator Mansfield, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 112
Cong. Rec. 140,141 (1966).
150. The International Control Commission is an impartial fact-finding body com-
posed of delegates from Canada, India and Poland. The Commission reports any viola-
tions of the Geneva Accords.
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Vietnam to the South.' 5 ' While the conflict involved mainly various
factions in the South, the insurgents were being actively supported by
North Vietnam, thus removing the conflict from the "civil strife" cate-
gory.
152
Perhaps the strongest argument against categorizing the conflict
as an internal affair is the precedent which would be established for
similar situations. Both Korea and Germany were partitioned by agree-
ments that on their face, contemplated reunification. To argue that
North Vietnam has a right to forcefully reunify Vietnam is to license
a unification of Germany and Korea by force. 5' A rule of international
law so unsettling and conducive to violence should have no place in
today's already restless world.
2. DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires that mem-
bers shall refrain from "the threat or use of force" in a manner "in-
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations." As a member of
the United Nations, the United States is obligated to pursue every
avenue to a peaceful solution of its international conflicts before re-
sorting to the use of force. Article 2(6) of the Charter indicates that
this obligation is present even when dealing with non-member states
such as North and South Vietnam." 4
An exception to this prohibition of the use of force is found in
Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter. Article 51 provides that force may
be used to repel an "armed attack,"155 and Article 52 provides for the
establishment of regional defense agreements.'56 The effect of such re-
gional agreements is to make an armed attack on any party to the
agreement justify a self-defensive use of force by any other party to
the agreement as well as by the country that was actually attacked.'
Under Article 51, the right to use force in self-defense is limited
151. Dep't of State, Department Statement, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 109 (1962).
152. Stevenson, U.S. Submits Report on Vietnam to U.N. Security Council, 52 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 419 (1965).
153. E. ROSTOW, LAW, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 65 (1968).
154. 1 L. OPPENHEIhS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
155. U.N. CAmRTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council ....
156. U.N. CirARTER art. 52:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
157. L. OPPENrEIm, supra note 143, at 156.
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to those instances when an actual "armed attack" has occurred.15 It is
not necessary to the finding of an "armed attack," however, that an
overt invasion be involved159 or that the attack be waged directly by
the principal aggressor.16 ° It is also not essential that the attack be
made against a territory or sovereign member of the United Nations.""
The United Nations action in Korea further established the precedent
that aggression against one zone of a divided state by forces of the
other zone invokes the right of self-defense under Article 51.162
Any right to use force against North Vietnam that the United States
may possess is derived from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, 68 of which South Vietnam is a protocol state.'64 The first U.S.
action against the North occurred in February 1965, when the policy of
bombing military installations in the North was first implemented.6 5
This action can be justified, therefore, only if it is found that an "armed
attack" was launched against South Vietnam before that time and that
the bombing was a proportionate response to the attack.
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While the factual determination of an armed attack is often difficult
to make, it appears that such an armed attack had been launched against
South Vietnam before February 1965. In 1962 the International Control
Commission reported that the infiltration of men and arms into the South
had "the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile
activities, including armed attacks, directed against the . . . South."'
While the claims of the belligerents as to the existence of attacks may be
discarded as being largely self-motivated, this Commission operated as an
impartial fact-finding body under the Geneva Accords and its observa-
tions are probably as reliable as any which are available.
The question of proportionality of response is more difficult. In spite
of U.S. claims of careful restraint in the use of airpower against the
North, 68 the tonnage of bombs dropped has been enormous. 6 9 While the
factual question of whether it was necessary to use this much force is
difficult to answer, it would appear that it is not grossly out of proportion
with the threat involved, especially since infiltration from the North con-
tinues daily in spite of the bombing.
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COMMENTS
Articles 51 and 52 also require that any nation resorting to force in self-
defense report the incident to the Security Council as soon as possible.'""
The United States has complied with this requirement and has, in fact,
undertaken a continuing duty to keep the Security Council informed as to
new developments in the conflict.' 7 ' After continued insistence by the
United States, the Security Council finally voted on February 2, 1966, to
place the Vietnam question on its agenda.1 2 This.was, however, as much
as has been accomplished, and no action has ever been taken by the
Security Council to restore peace in Vietnam. 173 The United States has
acknowledged the "authority and responsibility of the Security Council
... to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to...
restore international peace and security by action in Vietnam."' 74 But,
as a practical matter, as long as the veto power exists in the Security
Council it is doubtful that action will be taken in favor of either side in
the conflict' 75 Failure of the Security Council to act should not be taken
as tacit approval of United States involvement in Vietnam,'176 however.
Once the notification requirement of Article 51 has been satisfied,
the use of force in self-defense is "permitted only for so long as the
Security Council has not taken the necessary steps to maintain or restore
international peace and security."' 77 Theoretically, this means that the
United States may continue bombing the North until either the Security
Council acts on the matter or the infiltration from the North ceases. 8
C. A Pragmatic Approach
The United States appears to be in the embarrassing position, with
regard to Vietnam, of having acted first without regard to international
law and now, due to the unpopularity of the war, being forced to look to
international law to justify its position. This practice of molding the law
to fit an individual situation is particularly bad when the country involved
is a world leader such as the United States, because:
when the United States acts unilaterally in defiance of inter-
national law, it does not buy time. It sets the clock back. After
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the crisis has passed, it cannot expect again to take up its
rhetorical commitment to world order, as if nothing had hap-
pened. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United
States creates standards of conduct by its own acts.7
This situation is the result of the universal practice of placing polit-
ical expendiency above international law. 8 ' But so long as the United
Nations fails to provide an effective means of policing infractions of inter-
national law, the practice will undoubtedly continue.' 8 '
The cry for a stronger United Nations, and specifically a Security
Council that cannot be stymied by a single veto, has been issued many
times.8 2 Perhaps the tragedy of Vietnam will provide the impetus needed
to bring about these changes. The chance of such a sweeping change being
made is poor indeed, but without this modification of the present world
organization the prospects for the future are dim.
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